Introduction
In oligopolistic industries firms face at least two types of uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty about the evolution of demand and possibly also production technology. This type of uncertainty is typically exogenous to the industry. Second, there is uncertainty that emerges endogenously from the strategic decisions of firms. This strategic uncertainty often arises because a firm does not know the exact cost structure of its rivals and therefore cannot perfectly predict their decisions.
It matters because a firm's decision regarding capacity addition and withdrawal, say, has both an immediate impact on the profitability of its rivals and the potential to shape the evolution of the industry for years to come.
In practice demand uncertainty and strategic uncertainty are important, and the strategic management literature on capacity decisions exhorts managers to think carefully about both. For example, in his classic work Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter writes: "Because capacity additions can involve lead times measured in years and capacity is often long lasting, capacity decisions require the firm to commit resources based on expectations about conditions far into the future.
Two types of expectations are crucial: those about future demand and those about competitors' behavior. The importance of the former in capacity decisions is obvious. Accurate expectations about competitors' behavior is essential as well" (Porter 1980, p. 324) . Highlighting how strategic uncertainty can complicate the formation of expectations about competitors' behavior, Porter goes on to state, "If firms have differing perceptions of each other's relative strengths, resources, and staying power, they tend to destabilize the capacity expansion process" (pp. 332-333) .
Demand uncertainty has received much attention in the literature, and there is by now a large body of research about investment under this type of uncertainty (see Dixit & Pindyck 1994) . This real options theory mainly considers monopolistic or perfectly competitive settings. There are but a few papers combining real options theory with the strategic interactions that arise in dynamic games played by multiple firms. Most study simple games that end once the option has been exercised (e.g., Smets 1991 , Grenadier 1996 , Lambert & Perraudin 2003 , Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti & Moreaux 2004 , Huisman & Kort 2004 , Pawlina & Kort 2006 , Mason & Weeds 2007 . Examples include adopting a new technology or entering a new market. 1 It is not possible to partially recover the investment or to follow up on it with additional investments.
In Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite (2008) we consider a setting that is flexible enough to characterize fully or partially sunk investment. Our model of an oligopolistic industry is fully dynamic in that a firm can each period decide to add or withdraw capacity. We moreover capture the strategic uncertainty that firms face about their rivals' investment/disinvestment decisions by assuming that a firm is privately informed about its own cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal.
We show that, under certain conditions, the evolution of the industry takes the form of a race.
Each firm invests aggressively to expand its capacity before its rivals can do so. The industry ultimately reaches an asymmetric structure dominated by the winner of the race. Pursuing an aggressive approach to investment in an attempt to preempt rivals is thus a deliberate competitive move that has a lasting effect on the structure of the industry. This is consistent with the dominance of DuPont of the North American titanium dioxide industry that can be traced back to the preemptive strategy of capacity accumulation that DuPont initiated in the early 1970's (Ghemawat 1984 , Ghemawat 1997 , Hall 1990 .
In this paper, we build on Besanko et al. (2008) to explore capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics under both demand and strategic uncertainty. Without demand uncertainty, the role of strategic uncertainty is bound to diminish over time: Once the industry has reached a "steady state," investment activity comes to a halt, except possibly to make up for depreciation. Hence, it may not matter much that a firm does not know the exact cost structure of its rivals and therefore cannot perfectly predict their decisions to add or withdraw capacity. Fluctuations in demand call for firms to adjust their capacities on an ongoing basis and therefore ensure the continued importance of strategic uncertainty. Moreover, a sufficiently large swing in demand may upset the established structure of the industry. Combing the two types of uncertainty in one model therefore holds the promise of generating new and interesting insights.
We incorporate demand uncertainty into the fully dynamic, model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment/disinvestment developed and analyzed in Besanko et al. (2008) . The description of the model is abridged; we refer the reader to Besanko et al. (2008) Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. At the beginning of a period, firms first learn their cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal. The cost of capacity addition of firm 1 is η e,1 = φ e + e θ 1 and its benefit of capacity withdrawal is η w,1 = φ w + w θ 1 , where θ 1 is a meanzero random variable with support [−1, 1], and φ e , φ w , e > 0, and w > 0 are location and scale parameters, respectively. The difference between φ e and φ w measures the sunkness of investment.
To capture the changing nature of investment opportunities, we assume that θ 1 is drawn anew each period and that draws are independent across periods and firms. Its cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal is private to a firm and hence unknown to its rival. Incorporating incomplete information in this way allows us to capture the strategic uncertainty that firms face about their rivals' investment/disinvestment decisions. Because θ 1 is private to firm 1, firm 2 as it makes its investment/disinvestment decisions in state (d, i, j) "sees" only the investment/disinvestment probabilities of firm 1,
rather than its decisions e 1 (d, i, j, θ 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} and w 1 (d, i, j, θ 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} to add or withdraw ∆ units of capacity.
After firms have made their investment/disinvestment decisions, but before these decision are implemented, they compete in a differentiated product market by setting prices subject to capacity constraints. The Nash equilibrium of the product market game determines firms' single-period profit functions π 1 (d, i, j) and π 2 (d, i, j). In the product market game, the demand function for firm 1 is At the end of the period, the investment/disinvestment decisions are implemented and previously installed capacity is subjected to depreciation. We think of depreciation as being of a physical nature such as machine breakdowns, technological obsolescence, and natural disasters, and assume that a firm is subjected to depreciation with probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. The state of demand finally changes according to the exogenous Markov process specified above. Hence, the industry transits from its current state (d, i, j) to some other state (d , i , j ) at the beginning of the subsequent period.
The solution concept is symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE). Existence follows from the arguments in . Below we focus on the case of almost perfect substitutes (γ = 0.99), partially sunk investment (φ e = 72 and φ w = 24), and significant depreciation (δ = 0.1). We set the stage for strategic uncertainty by assuming substantial variation in the cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal across firms and periods ( e = 36 and w = 12). The remaining parameter values are as described in Besanko et al. (2008) . We use the homotopy pathfollowing method first applied to dynamic stochastic games by Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov & Satterthwaite (2009) (see also Borkovsky, Doraszelski & Kryukov 2008) to map out the equilibrium correspondence of our game; we are particularly interested in how equilibrium behavior and the industry dynamics implied by it change with ρ, our measure of demand uncertainty.
Results
In Besanko et al. (2008) we study the special case without demand uncertainty (D = 1 or ρ = 0).
We show that low product differentiation, low investment sunkness, and high depreciation promote preemption races. During a preemption race, firms continue investing as long as their capacities are similar. The race comes to an end once one of the firms gains the upper hand. At this point, the investment process stops and a process of disinvestment starts. During the disinvestment process some of the excess capacity that has been built up during the race is removed.
Low product differentiation gives rise to a price-umbrella effect that incentivizes both the leader and the follower to start the disinvestment process at the end of a preemption race. Both low investment sunkness and high depreciation imply high investment reversibility and promote preemption races by allowing firms to remove some of the excess capacity that has been built up during the race. In contrast, if they lack a means to remove capacity, then firms have no reason to enter a preemption race in the first place because they anticipate that the industry will be permanently locked into a state of excess capacity and low profitability after the race. 3
While the idea that reversibility can spur rather than hinder preemption contrasts with conventional wisdom in investment theory (see, e.g., p. 345 of Tirole 1988) , it is in line with the empirical findings in the North American newsprint and U.K. brick industries. These industries differ mainly in the sunkness of investment. In the former, investment sunkness is low and there is evidence suggestive of "some sort of race to add capacity" (Christensen & Caves 1997, p. 48) . In the latter, in contrast, investment sunkness is high and "in general brick firms manage to sequence successfully their capacity expansion insofar as they avoid excessive contemporaneous bunching of expansions" (Wood 2005, p. 43) .
We also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness promote capacity coordination in the sense that there is little (if any) excess capacity relative to the benchmark of a capacity cartel. Therefore, preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand-inhand with capacity coordination in the long run. The association of these seemingly contradictory behaviors is consistent with observing both preemption races and capacity coordination in the North American newsprint industry where investment is partially sunk. It is also consistent with Gilbert & Lieberman's (1987) finding that in the 24 chemical processing industries studied preemption may be a temporary phenomenon and that "the main role of preemptive activity is to coordinate new investment and to promote efficiency by avoiding excess capacity" (p. 30).
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the model with demand uncertainty (D > 1 and ρ > 0). We ask how demand uncertainty affects equilibrium behavior and the industry dynamics implied by it. Having computed an equilibrium for a particular parameterization of the model, we use the investment/disinvestment probabilities e 1 (d, i, j) and w 1 (d, i, j) along with the exogenous Markov process governing demand to construct the probability distribution over next period's state (d , i , j ) given this period's state (d, i, j) . With this transition matrix in hand, we are able to characterize equilibrium industry dynamics by computing the distribution over states, and hence the structure of the industry, at any point in time. The limiting distribution µ (∞) over states describes the industry in the long run. 4 From it, we compute the Herfindahl index of firms' capacities as
The Herfindahl index summarizes expected industry structure and dynamics. To the extent that it exceeds 0.5, an asymmetric industry structure arises and persists in the long run. We additionally compute the total capacity of the industry implied by the equilibrium in the long run as
We finally compute the total capacity of the industry conditional on the state of demand.
ciation is beyond the control of firms. Hence, the leader keeps a "safety stock" of capacity to counter the risk that the industry leadership is lost to depreciation. This hinders the extent of capacity coordination. We next take a closer look at the differences between the multiple equilibria that arise for a particular degree of demand uncertainty. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the three equilibria for ρ = 0.1 differ in terms of the Herfindahl index (H (∞) = 0.98, 0.95, and 0.82) and the total capacity of the industry (q (∞) = 4.58, 5.78, and 4.67) 6 . Even more interesting, the three equilibria exhibit very different patterns of how the individual firms respond to fluctuations in demand. To illustrate, we depict in Figures 2-4 the limiting distribution over states.
The first equilibrium gives the most asymmetric long-run industry structure and the lowest total capacity. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the industry is most likely dominated by a large firm with 4∆ or 5∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units. As our model assumes that a firm with zero capacity faces zero demand, the large firm is in effect a monopolist. Moreover, the small firm has very little chance to "break into" in the market: Even when demand conditions are As a consequence, in the first equilibrium the total capacity increases in expectation from 3.86∆ units in the worst demand state to 5.31∆ units in the best demand state. In contrast, in both the second and the third equilibrium, the total capacity of the industry is much more responsive to fluctuations in demand. In the second equilibrium the total capacity increases from 4.26∆ units in the worst demand state to 7.32∆ units in the best demand state and in the third equilibrium from 3.93∆ units to 5.36∆ units (see bottom panels of Figure 1 ). In sum, in the latter two equilibria, the total capacity of the industry adjusts to meet demand, a phenomenon observed by Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & Whistler (1991) in their study of the highly cyclical North American newsprint industry.
In the second equilibrium, in the worst demand state, the industry is almost certainly dominated by a large firm, most likely with 4∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units (see top left panel of Figure 3 ). In the best demand state, the industry is still most likely to be dominated by a large firm, now with 8∆ units of capacity while the small firm has 0∆ units (see bottom left panel).
Thus for most sequences of private shocks to the cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal the large firm acts as the swing producer that adjusts to fluctuations in demand. Indeed, the leader defends its dominant position by aggressively investing in up to 8∆ units of capacity, leaving the follower little room for survival. But for some sequences of private shocks the roles reverse. As can be seen in the bottom left panel of Figure 3 , in the best demand state, there is a good chance that the industry reaches either state (4, 2) or state (2, 4). Now the follower is the swing producer and uses "good times" as an opportunity to enter the market and partially catch up with the leader.
The third equilibrium gives the least asymmetric long-run industry structure. As can be seen in Figure 4 , the leader behaves much softer and, in good times, allows the follower to break into the market. Indeed, the large firm is most likely to remain at 4∆ units of capacity irrespective of the state of demand. The small firm is always the swing producer.
Our findings on how the individual firms respond to fluctuations in demand are not easily explained by the existing literature. Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1985) show that, in a deterministically declining market, the larger (higher-capacity) firm exits first. 7 Ghemawat & Nalebuff (1990) assume that firms can continuously adjust their capacities (rather than exit) and show that, again, the larger firm shrinks first. Once it has reached the same size as its rival, both firms continue shrinking together. Whinston (1988) shows that anything can happen if firms have multiple plants; in particular the larger firm (with two plants) does not necessarily exit before the smaller firm (with one plant). What happens depends on the details of the model, and there are no simple rules.
However, if firms differ only in the number of plants that they own and plants are identical, a scenario that seems close to our model, then the larger firm is necessarily the swing producer (Whinston 1988, pp. 584-585) .
In contrast, our results show that the swing producer can be either the large firm or the small firm depending on the equilibrium the industry settles on. Since there are multiple equilibria, the economic primitives do not suffice to tie down firms' behavior. How the industry evolves depends on how firms expect the industry to evolve.
In sum, our model of capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics under both demand 7 Fudenberg & Tirole (1986) show that the higher-cost firm exits first. 
